Curse of the Black Swan: How the Law of Salvage Perpetuates Indeterminate Ownership of Shipwrecks by Tsai, Jennifer




The law of salvage has traditionally determined the ownership of discovered shipwrecks. Be-
cause it grants possessory status to the first party that discovers the shipwreck pending a final
determination of ownership, it offers an advantage over the law of finds by avoiding the
potentially destructive effects of open conflict in the seas among competing claimants. In pre-
serving the rights of the salvor as first finder, salvage law jurisprudence grants possessory
status to the salvor without requiring positive identification of the vessel and a liberal salvage
award for the salvor should an owner with superior claim be found. This article explains how
salvage law jurisprudence can present challenges in the ascertainment of identity and owner-
ship in the discovery of an unidentified ship known as the Black Swan, in which a sovereign's
prospective claim of ownership can be hindered by salvage law's interest in protecting the
rights of the salvor.
In May of 2007, a U.S. commercial salvage company announced that it had salvaged
$500 million worth of colonial-era gold and silver coins from a shipwreck found in inter-
national waters of the Atlantic.' The company that found the shipwreck, Odyssey Marine
Explorations (Odyssey), claims that it has been unable to identify the origins of the sunken
vessel and has taken to calling the shipwreck the "Black Swan." 2 Citing concerns about
attracting would-be looters to the site of the vessel, Odyssey has been apprehensive in
divulging more details on its find.3 Nonetheless, Odyssey's secrecy has done little to dis-
courage the efforts of the Kingdom of Spain, who believes the discovered shipwreck to be
the remains of a thirty-six gun Spanish frigate that sank two hundred years ago, the
"Nuestra Sefiora de las Mercedes," and is convinced that Odyssey knows more than what
it has publicly stated.4 On May 30, 2007, Spain filed suit in a U.S. district court in Flor-
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1. See Greg Mien, Mystery, Legal Fight Surround Shipwreck Treasure, NAT'L PUBLIC RADIO, July 5, 2007,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld= 11759831 &sc=emaf.
2. See John Ward Anderson, Will Finders Be Keepers of Lost Treastre?, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 2007, at Al.
3. See id.
4. See id.
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ida, where the recovered artifacts are now located, in order to compel Odyssey to disclose
the wreck's identity and location, halt future salvage efforts, and hand over to Spain what
had already been salvaged.5
The ensuing legal battle has pitted a commercial salvage company that aims to make a
profit from its lucrative find against a claimant seeking to assert its ownership interest as a
sovereign nation. This paper attempts to explain how admiralty law's handling of an un-
identified shipwreck in international waters enhances and expands the salvor's opportuni-
ties for salvage while prolonging the legal dispute over ownership. Part I explains
admiralty law jurisdiction, the common law of finds, and the law of salvage. Part II fo-
cuses on Spain's difficulties in evaluating and asserting its claim of ownership when the
identity of the vessel is unknown. Part III discusses how the salvor is able to conduct its
salvage operations without the risk of being denied a salvage award if there should be an
owner who intends to reject salvage efforts.
I. Admiralty Law
A. JURISDICTION OF SHIPWRECKS
The U.S. federal courts have the authority to handle "all Cases of Admiralty and Mari-
time Jurisdiction." 6 This jurisdiction includes "maritime causes of action begun and car-
ried on as proceedings in rem, that is, where a vessel or thing is itself treated as the
offender and made the defendant by name or description in order to enforce a lien."7
B. LAW OF FINDS
Under the law of finds, the first finder to lawfully take actual possession or control of
the shipwreck acquires title to it.8 A salvor who is the first finder of a shipwreck must: (1)
show intent to acquire the property and take actual possession or control of it; and (2)
establish that the property has been abandoned. 9 Thus, the application of the law of finds
requires a determination that the shipwreck has been abandoned by the previous owner.10
To demonstrate possession, there must be "an actual taking of the property with the intent
to reduce it to possession."" But, circuit courts vary in their standards of what constitutes
abandonment. For example, the Fourth Circuit has required express renunciation by the
previous owner, 12 while the First, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits implicate a presumption of
5. Id.; see also Claimant Kingdom of Spain's Unopposed Motion to Vacate at 1-2, Odyssey Marine Explo-
ration, Inc. v. The Unidentified Vessel or Vessels, No. 8:06-CV-1685-T23-TBM (M. D. Fla. June 15, 2007).
6. California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491, 501 (1998) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. m, § 2, cl.
1).
7. Id. (quoting Madruga v. Superior Court of Cal., County of San Diego, 346 U.S. 556, 560 (1954)).
8. See Kevin Berean, Sea Hunt, Inc. v. The Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel or Vessels: How the Fourth Circuit
Rocked the Boat, 67 BROOK. L. REv. 1249, 1252 (2002).
9. See id.
10. See Columbus-Am. Discovery Group v. At. Mut. Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 450, 464 (4th Cir. 1992).
11. Eads v. Brazelton, 22 Ark. 499, 511 (1861).
12. See Sea Hunt, Inc. v. Unidentified, Shipwrecked Vessel or Vessels, 47 F. Supp. 2d 678, 685-88 (E.D. Va.
1999).
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abandonment from the passage of time. 13 The Sixth and Ninth Circuits appear to take an
intermediate approach, inferring abandonment from the totality of circumstances, other-
wise known as the implied abandonment test. 14 If salvors are unable to demonstrate that
the wreck has been abandoned, they will usually seek a salvage award under the law of
salvage. 15
C. LAW OF SALVAGE
Under the law of salvage, the salvor of imperiled property on navigable waters gains a
right of compensation but not outright title, which is retained by the original owner. 16
The elements of a salvage claim are: (1) there must be a marine peril; (2) the salvage
service must be voluntarily rendered when not required by an existing duty or by special
contract; and (3) the salvage efforts must be successful, in whole or in part.17 The law of
salvage involves two separate proceedings. The first includes a grant of exclusive salvor-
in-possession status for the salvor who first discovers the vessel followed by the grant of an
award once property is actually possessed.18 At the request by the salvor through an in
rem admiralty action, the salvor can be granted exclusive salvor-in-possession status by
obtaining a maritime lien on the vessel, which permits the salvor to salvage the shipwreck
without the interference of rival salvors. 19 Salvors are entitled to a liberal salvage award
that often exceeds the value of the services rendered, and if no owner claims the vessel, the
salvor is normally awarded its total value.20
II. Spain's Indeterminate Claim of Ownership
A. A RELAXED STANDARD OF PARTICUTLART IN PLEADING REQUIREMENTS
At issue in the case surrounding the ownership of the Black Swan is Odyssey's apparent
inability to identify the vessel in the face of Spain's contentions that Odyssey is being too
evasive. 21 Specifically, Odyssey has stated in its in rem admiralty action that nothing thus
far recovered in its salvage efforts appears to indicate that any third party would have a
superior claim.22 Spain, convinced that Odyssey is concealing crucial information about
13. See, e.g., Martha's Vineyard Scuba Headquarters, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Steam
Vessel, 833 F.2d 1059, 1065 (1st Cir. 1987); Klein v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 758
F.2d 1511, 1514 (11th Cir. 1985); Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing
Vessel, 569 F.2d 330, 337 (5th Cir. 1978).
14. See, e.g. Fairport Int'l Exploration, Inc. v. Shipwrecked Vessel, known as the Captain Lawrence, 177
F.3d 491,499-500 (6th Cir. 1999); Deep Sea Research, Inc. v. Brother Jonathan, 102 F.3d 379, 387-88 (9th
Cir. 1996).
15. See, e.g., Columbus-Am. Discovery Group, 974 F.2d at 461.
16. See id. at 459.
17. See The Sabine, 101 U.S. 384, 384 (1879).
18. See Justin S. DuClos, A Conceptual Wreck: Salvaging the Law of Finds, 38J. MAR. L. & COM. 25, 25-27
(2007).
19. See id. at 27.
20. See Columbus-Am. Discovery Group, 974, F.2d at 459.
21. See Scott Barancik, Spain: Odyssey Is Playing a Game, ST PETERSBURG TimEs, Sept. 21, 2007, at ID.
22. See Amended Verified Complaint in Admiralty at T 18, Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc. v. The Un-
identified Shipwrecked Vessel, No. 8:06-CV-01685-SDM-TBM (M.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 2007) (stating that Odys-
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the vessel,2 3 maintains that Odyssey's pleadings are not in compliance with Rules C(2)(b)
and E(2)(a) of the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty and Maritime Claims.24 Rule
(C)(2)(B) of the Supplemental Rules states that for actions in rem, the complaint "must
describe with reasonable particularity the property that is the subject of the action." 25
Rule E(2)(a) states that in actions in rem, "the complaint shall state the circumstances
from which the claim arises with such particularity that the defendant or claimant will be
able, without moving for a more definite statement, to commence an investigation of the
facts and frame a responsive pleading." 26
The issue of the specificity of pleadings for in rem admiralty actions has arisen before in
Fathom Exploration, LLC v. The Unidentified Shipwreck Vessel or Vessels, where the court
found that the salvor, Fathom Exploration (Fathom), was required to plead with particu-
larity regarding a shipwreck's location but was not required to positively identify the vessel
before initiating action. 27 There, the state of Alabama had a potential claim over the
vessel or vessels if the discovery was located in Alabama waters and met the requirements
for being "embedded" and "abandoned" under the Abandoned Shipwreck Act.28 The
State argued, however, that it could not ascertain the validity of its claim of ownership
because Fathom failed to properly describe the vessel or vessels or provide the exact loca-
tion, making it impossible to determine from the pleading whether the ship granted title
to Alabama pursuant to the statute.2 9 The court agreed, finding that a responsive pleading
by Alabama without any basis to assess the validity of its claim would necessarily be "spec-
ulative and conditional," severely hindering Alabama's efforts to actively pursue its claim
of ownership.30 The court held that although Fathom might not have known the name of
the vessel or vessels, it surely had the precise location as well as enough data after months
of research to conclude whether the shipwreck was embedded in the ocean floor.31 This
information, even if it was "preliminary, inconclusive, and subject to revision," should
have been provided in Fathom's claim in admiralty in order for Alabama to initiate an
investigation and craft a sufficiently responsive pleading.32
But, the court held that the Supplemental Rules did not require the salvor to positively
identify a wreck before bringing an action for arrest of the vessel. 33 The court reasoned
sey believes the find to be that of a 17th century merchant vessel and that nothing recovered from the vessel
to date "confirms an interest in the artifacts of any third party including the Kingdom of Spain.").
23. See Anderson, supra note 2, at Al (quoting James A. Goold, attorney for Spain, as saying "[e]verything
points to Odyssey having known exactly what ship they were looking for and having then decided to claim it
was unidentified").
24. See Opposition by Claimant-Defendant Kingdom of Spain to Plaintiffs Motion for Protective Order at
3, Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc., v. The Unidentified Vessel or Vessels, No. 8:06-CV-1685-T23-TBM
(M. D. Fla. Sept. 19, 2007).
25. Supplemental Admiralty and Maritime Claims Rule C(2)(b) 28 U.S.C.A.
26. Supplemental Admiralty and Maritime Claims Rule E(2)(a) 28 U.S.C.A.
27. See Fathom Exploration, LLC v. The Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel or Vessels, 352 F. Supp. 2d
1218, 1218 (S.D. Ala. 2005).
28. See id. at 1222-23. The Act grants the United States title over any abandoned shipwreck embedded in a
state's submerged lands. See 43 U.S.C. § 2105(a) (2000). The United States then transfers title "to the State
in or on whose submerged lands the shipwreck is located." 43 U.S.C. § 2105(c) (2000).




33. See id. at 1225.
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that to find otherwise "would do violence to time-honored admiralty principles relating to
salvage." 34 Requiring positive identification before commencing legal action would strip
exclusive salvage rights of the protection they provide in granting the salvor the benefits of
being the first to discover and salvage a shipwreck, as salvors would have to contend
against a "feeding frenzy of competing salvors and claimants swarming around a shipwreck
site," risking damage to the vessel as well as the archaeological and historical value of the
site.35
B. EFFECTS OF PLEADING REQUIREMENTS ON SPAIN'S CLAIM
The Fathom case presents a tension between the law of salvage and the law of finds in an
attempt to strike a balance between the competing interests of the salvor and the prospec-
tive claimant. When exclusive salvage rights can be granted without requiring positive
identification of the vessel, it encourages new discoveries by salvors via ensuring the salvor
will derive a benefit from its labor as well as allowing the exercise of salvage rights free
from conflicts with competing salvors.36 On the other hand, the law of finds is premised
on fair competition whereby the find is freely available to the entire world before it is
reduced to actual possession. 37 Granting preliminary exclusive salvage rights chills this
competition in preventing the conditions that the law of finds requires by restricting the
availability of the vessel to other claimants.38
Fathom presents an example of this limited competition by impairing the efforts of pro-
spective claimants to investigate and assess their claims. The lack of information did not
preclude Fathom from initiating legal action and continuing its salvage efforts while at the
same time the state of Alabama was unable to actively pursue its claim because it simply
did not have enough information to proceed with an adequately responsive pleading. A
similar situation appears to play out in the legal dispute over the Black Swan, in which
Odyssey can maintain exclusive salvage rights while Spain preoccupies itself with legal
actions to press for more information about the vessel, all while being unable to assert a
claim of ownership.
As of now, Spain is unable to make a legal claim of ownership while the vessel's origins
remain a mystery. If it can be established that the Black Swan is indeed a ship formerly
commissioned by Spain, Spain would attempt to lay claim to the vessel based on sovereign
immunity under the 1902 Treaty of Friendship and General Relations Between the
United States and Spain, in which by virtue of Spain appearing in court to assert its claim
of ownership, Odyssey would have the substantial burden of showing that Spain neverthe-
less still had expressly abandoned the vessel. 39 While the doctrine of sovereign immunity
34. Id. at 1224.
35. Id. at 1225.
36. See DuClos, supra note 18, at 36-37 (arguing that as "the underwater environment is not conducive to a
raid and plunder free-for-all because it is a dangerous environment that easily threatens survival," salvage law
provides a benefit in encouraging "more controlled conduct").
37. See id. at 27.
38. See id.
39. The Constitution states that "Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this
Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State."
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. This clause has been interpreted as stating that the United States can only
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has been established in the Third Circuit for shipwrecks where the sovereign is the United
States,40 other courts have refrained from elucidating an abandonment standard in cases
where the sovereign has claimed ownership or where any owner appears at all, suggesting
that such cases merit different treatment from those where no other party has appeared in
court to challenge the salvor's claim.4 1 In addition, Spain's potential claim might be bol-
stered by the decision in Sea Hunt, Inc. v. The Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel or Vessels ("Sea
Hunt III"), where the Fourth Circuit granted Spain title to two Spanish vessels, La Galga
and the Juno based on a finding that Spain had not expressly abandoned the vessels under
Article XX of the 1763 Definitive Treaty of Peace Between France, Great Britain, and
Spain.42 The treaty ceded "all that Spain possesses on the continent of North America" to
Great Britain (later to the United States). 43 Such language, the court reasoned, was not
explicit enough to pertain to shipwrecks under the rigorous express abandonment stan-
dard applied by the court."
It remains to be seen whether the Fourth Circuit's acquiescence to Spain's ownership
interest establishes a precedent in admiralty law, as the opinion has been criticized for
applying an express abandonment standard and for its interpretation of the 1902 and 1763
Treaties in determining that Spain had not abandoned its shipwrecks. 45 But, given the
context of the decision in a case that represents the first instance where Spain actively
pursued a claim of ownership over its ships,46 it might be surmised that a U.S. court would
not be so quick to dismiss the claims of a sovereign nation.47 Indeed, the United States
might be persuaded to uphold Spain's claims of ownership out of principles of interna-
tional comity. In fact, the United States had previously argued in its amicus brief in Sea
Hunt III that by acknowledging Spain's ownership claim, the United States was seeking to
abandon its property by explicit acts. Under the 1902 Treaty of Friendship and General Relations Between
the United States and Spain, which granted reciprocal immunities for U.S. and Spanish shipwrecks, Spain is
granted the same immunity in the abandonment of its property. See Treaty of Friendship and General Rela-
tions, art. X, U.S.-Spain, July 3, 1902, 33 Stat. 2105.
40. See United States v. Steinmetz, 973 F.2d 212, 223 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding the United States is pre-
sumed to have retained tide to vessels sunk during the Civil War).
41. See Fairport, supra note 14, at 500 (6th Cir. 1999) ("we limit our holding to vessels formerly owned by
private parties, and express no view as to the application of the express abandonment test to vessels initially
owned by the United States."); see also Martha's Vineyard, supra note 13 at 1065 (1st Cir. 1987) (applying an
implied abandonment standard while noting that "no person or firm appeared to assert any overall claim of
ownership").
42. See Sea Hunt, Inc. v. Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel or Vessels, 221 F.3d 634, 646 (4th Cir. 2000)
[hereinafter Sea Hunt III].
43. See Definitive Treaty of Peace, Fr.-Gr. Brit.-Spain, art. XX, Feb.10, 1763, 42 Consol. T.S. 279, 331-32.
44. Sea Hunt II, 221 F.3d at 644.
45. See generally David J. Bederman, Maritime Preservation Law: Old Challenges, New Trends, 8 WIDENER L.
SyMp. J. 163, 175-84 (2002) (discussing how the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the 1763 Treaty is incon-
sistent and fails to conform with customary international law).
46. See Sea Hunt I1, 221 F.3d at 647. In previous cases where Spanish wrecks were found to be abandoned,
Spain had declined to appear in court to make a claim of ownership. See id. (citing Treasure Salvors, Inc., 569
F.2d at 337 and Lathrop v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, 817 F. Supp. 953, 956 (M.D. Fla.
1993)).
47. See Martha's Vineyard, 833 F.2d at 1065 (applying an implied abandonment standard while noting that
no other party had appeared to claim the shipwreck). This case appears to indicate that a court would take
into consideration that a claimant has appeared in court to make a claim despite an implied abandonment
standard.
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ensure that its own sunken vessels "are treated as sovereign ships ... and are not subject to
exploration, or exploitation, by private parties seeking treasures of the sea."4s
All in all, the validity of Spain's claim to the Black Swan, whether because of sovereign
immunity or out of international comity, is contingent on the identity of the shipwreck. If
the shipwreck was not originally a Spanish vessel, Spain cannot assert ownership on any
alternative grounds, as the shipwreck, according to Odyssey, lies in international waters,
beyond the limits of any sovereign to exercise its territorial jurisdiction to lay claim to the
vessel.49 Odyssey, therefore, has an interest in divulging as little information as possible
so as to hinder Spain's ability to investigate its claim and frame a responsive pleading.
Even if the court should intercede and request Odyssey to amend its pleading, identifying
the vessel may pose challenges that would take more time than simply determining title
through location since, unlike identity, location would be easily ascertainable upon discov-
ery.50 As a result, Spain cannot assert a legal claim of ownership until it can positively
identify the vessel, either by Odyssey providing the identity or through its own investiga-
tion should Odyssey be compelled to release more information. Either option requires
time, which delays a final decision as to ownership since the court would likely want to
consider Spain's actions as a previous owner if Spain is able to assert its rights as a sover-
eign over the vessel. In the meantime, Odyssey is able to continue its salvage operations
as the exclusive salvor.
M. Salvage Award
Odyssey's interest in securing a salvage award if it is not granted title is also dependent
on the identity of the wreck. Although the owner has the right to refuse unwanted sal-
vage,5t this right of refusal is not effective until the salvor, "acting as a reasonable person,
has determined or could determine, the ownership of the object of salvage." 52 For in-
stance, in Sea Hunt III, the court affirmed the district court's denial of a salvage award
because the salvor knew before bringing legal action that it had discovered a Spanish ship,
thus alerting it to the possibility of Spain's ownership claim and refusal of salvage activ-
ity. 53 In the case of the Black Swan, because Spain's ownership remains indeterminate,
48. Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting the Kingdom of Spain, Sea Hunt, Inc. v. The
Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel or Vessels, 221 F.3d 634 (2000) (No. 99-2035), 1999 WL 33613886. See
also Berean, supra note 8, at 1289 ("Indeed, the call from Spain to recognize the La Galga and the Juno as
maritime graves and the first ever request from Spain for international cooperation, which the United States
sought to comply with, likely played a role in the Fourth Circuit's willingness to diverge from traditional
admiralty law.").
49. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas, art. 303, 2, Dec. 11, 1982, part XI!I, 21
I.L.M. 1245, 1326 (1982) (prohibiting removal of archaeological and historical objects at sea from within the
contiguous zone described in Article 33 without the coastal State's approval).
50. See Fathom, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 1225, n.9 (acknowledging that "there may be situations where a salvor
expends untold thousands of man-hours to identify a submerged wreck" as well as "situations where identify-
ing a wreck is as simple as reading the painted name of the vessel from the inscription on its intact stern or
bow"). Odyssey's pleadings appear to suggest the former situation. See Amended Verified Complaint, supra
note 22.
51. See Sea Hunt II1, 221 F.3d at 647-48, n.2 ("It is the right of the owner of any vessel to refuse unwanted
salvage.").
52. Tidewater Salvage, Inc., v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 633 F.2d 1304, 1307 (9th Cit. 1980).
53. See Sea Hunt III, 221 F.3d at 647-48, n.2.
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the knowledge of an ownership claim and a likely refusal of salvage54 cannot be imputed to
Odyssey. As there is no owner for Odyssey to force upon unwanted salvage, Odyssey is
able to take advantage of an opportunity to conduct more extensive salvage efforts without
the risk of being denied a salvage award. This could spur Odyssey to concentrate on its
salvage operations at the expense of efforts at gathering more information to identify the
vessel, maintaining the cloud of uncertainty surrounding ownership of the vessel and fur-
ther hindering Spain's ability to investigate or assert a claim of ownership.
IV. Conclusion
The cumulative effect of admiralty law in cases where an unidentified shipwreck is
found in international waters is that the salvor receives a two-fold benefit as first-finder
with preliminary exclusive salvage rights. First, because the sovereign's interest is subject
to the vessel's origin and identity, the salvor can exercise control over the vessel for the
time being while the sovereign, as a potential owner, can only speculate on the validity of
its claims and is hindered in pursuing decisive legal action. Also, the nature of salvage law
in permitting salvage awards while ownership remains inconclusive encourages the salvor
to focus its efforts on salvage rather than efforts to identify the vessel, exacerbating the
sovereign's difficulties in pursuing a legal claim. What results is the protracted and in-
creasingly heated legal dispute over the Black Swan, in which salvage law has removed
undesirable competition from the oceans but has replaced it with an equally contentious
conflict to be waged in the U.S. admiralty courts.
54. See Office of Ocean Affairs; Protection of Sunken Warships, Military Aircraft, and Other Sunken Gov-
ernment Property, 69 Fed. Reg. 5647 (Feb. 5, 2004) ("The Embassy of Spain accordingly wishes to give
notice that salvage or other disturbance of sunken vessels or their contacts is not authorized and may not be
conducted without express consent by an authorized representative of the Kingdom of Spain.").
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